Power is a concept which pervades politics: it is a key agent in the mobilisation, and preservation, of political thought and action, both within political institutions, and amongst political actors. Power can be defined in multiple ways; and it is the assignment of a specific definition that has been hotly debated amongst political scientists. From these debates, three faces of power have materialised: the pluralist view, with Robert Dahl as its chief proponent (Lukes, 2005); the ‘neo elitist’ view of Bachrach and Baratz (Hay, 2002; Lukes, 2005); and the ‘radical’ view established by Steven Lukes, in his book ‘Power: A Radical View’ (2005). It is through the lens of Lukes’ book that we will explore the contested manifestations of power – we shall walk through the various definitions presented, and attempt to evaluate the benefits, and flaws, of each.
Before we begin on our journey, however, I feel it would be important to try and acknowledge, and answer, any questions that you may already have. For example, you may be wondering why we should even go on this journey in the first place; why should we define ‘power’? Surely, we all have a concept of power, you may argue, so why not just leave it at that: why not let our individual concepts of power drive our own investigations? Would this not be intrinsically beneficial? Might it not illuminate more paths for investigation than a ‘constricted’ view of power? Granted, this heuristic approach to power may open up some unthought-of possibilities, but it may also constrict the rigour of observation: it could widen the intellectual landscape of power’s conceptualisation, but it would not deepen it. We therefore see that defining power is crucial to fully understanding the complexities of its real-world manifestations. To define ‘power’, however, is in and of itself a political act. But what do we mean by ‘political’? Although many definitions have been offered, the most appropriate for the case at hand will be Heywood’s (2000) definition of politics as “the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the rules under which they live” (cited in Jordan, 2019). Hence, if power is operational in the running of society, the definitional act will amend our understanding of the “rules” therefore embedding the idea of the ‘political’ in this process. Through the exploration of power’s various contexts we will not only gain insight into creating an operational definition of power.
One-dimensional power
The ‘one-dimensional’ view of power, as championed by Robert Dahl, argues that power does not reside solely amongst the elite, but that all actors have the ability to exert their influence in view of gaining some desired end – this forms the ‘pluralist’ approach to power (Lukes, 2005). This view of power is concerned with action: its manifestation, and examination, is bound to issues of conflict. The ‘pluralist’ theory is best summarised as follows:
A has power over B to the extent that he [sic] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. (Dahl, 1957 pp. 202-203)
This view provides a clear methodological framework for the assessment of power in real world situations. To determine if the exercise of power was manifest in any situation – using the pluralist approach – one had only to choose a decision area; identify the players in this area, and ascertain their interests/preferences; and then track which decisions had been made, and subsequently work out who had ‘won’ – according to whose interests had been met. This means that to assess power in this view, A’s actions must contest the actualisation of B’s interests/preferences. The mobilisation of an actor’s resources is another requirement in this view – power has become an active process, and its one-dimensional analysis requires as such. Lukes (2005) argues that it is the deployment of these parameters, in the one-dimensional view, which limits the analytic capabilities of this view of power.
Lukes summarises with the following:
… this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation. (2005: 19)
The use of emphasis reveals the cornerstone concepts in the one-dimensional view; this emphasis also directs our understanding of its limitations. Firstly, the emphasis on “behaviour”, “decisions”, and “conflict” highlights the fact that this view is bound to the active process of politics and policy-making: power can only be observed if it is exercised. This, as Lukes goes on to argue, is not necessarily true: an actor may be passive in the decision-making process, and yet still exert their influence on the final outcome – this view will be explored further as we enter Lukes’ other dimensions of power. Alongside “conflict”, Lukes also emphasises “issues” which highlights the second limitation of the pluralist view; in the one-dimensional power scheme “… direct conflict between actors presents a situation most closely approximating an experimental test of their capacities to affect outcomes” (Polsby, 1963 cited in Lukes, 2005: 18). This, like the first limitation, insists on the assessment of power only in active situations – it also instates a requirement for rivalry; this may not always be the case in situations where power is exercised. Finally, the use of “interests” presents the key dilemma that will be discussed in Lukes’ exploration of the third-dimension of power: that is, what are a person/group’s interests? How are interests defined? And who defines them? In addition to the flaws highlighted in Lukes’ synopsis, Dahl insists on both a time lag, and a connection between actors and respondents for power to exist. Must there be a time lag? And what determines the connection, and how far can it reach? Also, the very base of the one-dimensional view – pluralism – may be a limitation in and of itself: does the pluralist view of power limit the identification of non-pluralist power structures? From this, we can therefore see that although the pluralist view of power has some benefits – it fruitfully re-imagines the distribution of power in society, and provides a framework for the assessment of various instances of power relations – it also has some drawbacks; through Lukes’ exploration of the further dimensions of power we will discover the means to remove these constraints, and work towards a fuller view of power.
Two-dimensional power
The main proponents of the two-dimensional view of power were Bachrach and Baratz (1963) whereby ‘the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to “safe” issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures’ (p. 632) (cited in Ham and Hill, 1984: 64) was a direct manifestation of their view. This view presents a neo-elitist response to the pluralist arguments of Dahl, and Polsby (Hay, 2002): power can in fact reside within an ‘elite’ group that is able to influence the political agenda, and therefore stopping any ‘awkward’ issues being raised. This second dimension of power can be defined as the following:
To the extent that a person or group – consciously or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970 cited in Lukes, 2005: 20)
Deeply embedded in this concept is the idea of the “mobilisation of bias” (Schattschneider, 1960 cited in Lukes, 2005: 20) whereby “organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out.” (ibid.). This highlights a key idea in the second dimensional view: agenda-control is a crucial manifestation of power. Although some issues may not be discussed, this does not mean that they are not present in the political community. Moreover, “the mobilisation of bias can and frequently does benefit a clear majority” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970 cited in Lukes, 2005: 21) and “those who benefit [from the mobilisation of bias] are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests” (ibid.). This, in contrast to those views of the first dimension of power, shows that there is a powerful elite that control which issues are bought forward into the political agenda, and whose interests are catered for.
In addition to establishing the concept of a new elite in the field of power, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) also tackled the issue of defining/examining the various forms of power play that may be manifest in different situation; they are described as follows:
Coercion: “A secures B’s compliance by the threat of deprivation where there is ‘a conflict over values or course of action between A and B’”
Influence: “A, ‘without resorting to either a tacit or overt threat of severe deprivation, causes [B] to change his course of action’”
Authority: “B complies because he recognises that [A’s] command is reasonable in terms of his own values”
Force: “A achieves his objectives in the face of B’s noncompliance by stripping him of the choice between compliance and noncompliance”
(cited in Lukes, 2005: 21-22)
Coming under the umbrella of ‘force’, manipulation is found and described when “compliance is forthcoming in the absence of recognition of the complier’s part either of the source or the exact nature of the demand upon him” (ibid.). From these definitions, we can see that power is starting to become a much more complex idea that holds within it potentially endless forms of control. However, the issue of determining a player’s real interests once again presents an issue – this will be tackled in the next dimension of power.
A key component of Bachrach and Baratz’s view of power, is the idea of nondecision-making. This represents “a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced” (ibid. p. 22) which could involve non-action as a result of thinking that the other party will react in a negative way, or being part of a minority voice that may be overwhelmed in the decision-making process. In this way the scope of discussion is limited to ‘safe’ issues. The challenge then becomes: how does one assess a nondecision? How would this present itself? One way would be through the observation of grievances of stakeholders, both overt and covert, and the assessment of the level of assimilation of these grievances into the political agenda. However, as in pluralist view, we find that the “stress is on actual, observable conflict” (ibid.) and so some grievances may be misperceived, or simply overlooked; this is because there may be some grievances are simply not aired – these grievances may not even be perceived by the aggrieved themselves.
Three-dimensional power
As Lukes’ naming of the dimensions of power suggests, we have arrived at the final and fullest view of power. In the fashion of Dahl, Lukes (2005) summarises the third-dimension of power with the following:
A may exercise power over B by getting him [sic]to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants” (p. 27)
In this sense, we can see that the third-dimension holds within it the concept of ‘thought control’: where “thought control takes many … forms, through the control of information, through the mass media and through the process of socialisation.” (ibid.). This means that the powerful actors in society may not only direct the actions of their subordinates through action or conflict, but may also covertly direct their views in such a way that makes the subordinate unaware of any issues. This creates a deeper form of agenda setting: not only are the populous incapable of airing their issues, they are also incapable of realising them. Lukes therefore argues that there is another form of conflict that has not been covered by the other dimensions of power, he calls this “latent conflict” (ibid. p.28); this is manifest in the “contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude” (ibid.). It would therefore be short-sighted to assume that if “people feel no grievances, then they have no interests that are harmed by the use of power” (ibid.) – this is a fundamental flaw in both the first- and second-dimensional view. Power need not be acted upon, but only to be held, for its effects to be felt: power can be passive, as well as active.
References
Cox, A., Furlong, P., and Page, E., (1985). Power in Capitalist Societies: Theory, Explanations, and Cases. Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1985
Dahl, R.A., (1957). The concept of power. Behavioural science, 2(3), pp.201-215.
Ham, C., Hill, M. and Hill, M. J. (1984) The policy process in the modern capitalist state. Hemel Hempstead: Wheatsheaf, 1984.
Hay, C., (2002). Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002.
Jordan, A., (2019). What is environmental politics? Power and policy. ENV-5002B Environmental Politics and Policy Making. University of East Anglia. Unpublished.
Lukes, S., (2005). Power: A Radical View. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
BioSphere 